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Abstract: The Six Day War marked a turning point in Italy’s attitude toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict. During the crisis the Italian diplomacy tried to mediate in order to 
prevent an open war but this policy gave rise to harsh polemics among the coalition 
government. These disagreements revealed a deep rooted change which involved political 
and security matters. Energy issues became a top priority in the economic and political 
agenda and most of the Italian public opinion shifted toward a pro-Arab stance while the 
memories of the Holocaust were fading away. Moreover, the growing Soviet infiltration 
in the Mediterranean drove the Italian government to envisage security on a global scale 
while Israel maintained a regional approach. All these differences contributed in 
gradually shaping a new trend in Israeli-Italian relationships which lasted for a long 
time.  
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At the end of the ’60’s Italy gradually worked out a pro-Arab 
Mediterranean policy. This paper focuses on the major turning points 
shaping this new approach which implied a different attitude even 
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
     During the Six Day War,1 the majority of the Italian public opinion 
together with the political parties supporting the coalition government 
                                                 
1 On this topic see: E. HAMMEL, Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War, Washington, DC, Pacifica Military History, 2001; W. LAQUEUR, The Road to 
Jerusalem:The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967, New York, Macmillan, 1968; 
H. MEICHER, Sinai, 5 giugno 1967. Il conflitto arabo-israeliano, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
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backed the Jewish State. Undoubtedly from the beginning of the 
conflict the Italian diplomacy showed some ambiguities. On one hand, 
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amintore Fanfani, 
acknowledged Israeli’s position concerning the international status of 
the Gulf of Aqaba and the right to use the strait of Tiran for pacific 
purposes according to the Geneva agreement signed in 1958. On the 
other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the British 
project for a declaration guaranteeing the free navigation was 
“irreproachable”, but raised some «doubts about its political 
consequences, especially if a concrete action should follow in a short 
time».2  
     According to the British Ambassador Shuckburgh, Rome could not 
join London’s initiative since Italy promoted a policy of détente «within 
the United Nations». In Italy’s viewpoint the UN had indeed always 
played a key role in order to dampen the contrasts between the two 
superpowers and, in the meantime, it was perceived as a multilateral 
framework where Rome could preserve its international status. As part 
of this policy, Italy pressed for a UN declaration in favor of free 
                                                                                                 
2000; M.B. OREN, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle 
East, New York/Toronto, Random House Ballatine Publishing Group, 2002; R.B. 
PARKER, The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored, in «Middle East Journal», 
XLVI, 2, 1992; R.B. PARKER, The Six Day War, Jacksonville, University of Florida 
Press, 1997.  
2
 Appunto del Mae sul Progetto di dichiarazione britannica per assicurare la libera 
navigazione nel Golfo di Aqaba, 2 giugno 1967, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (thereafter 
ACS), Carte Moro (thereafter CM), b. 56. 
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navigation, dismissed the French proposal for a summit of the Big Four 
and labeled as “premature” the British idea for a contingency planning.3  
     Furthermore, the rejection of the British plan coupled with an 
internal harsh controversy when Fanfani promoted an approach based 
on the formula of “equal distance”4 between the two belligerents. 
Although the Prime Minister Aldo Moro managed to smooth down the 
disagreements within the coalition, it remained a widespread 
impression that Italy was inaugurating a new approach to its 
Mediterranean policy.5  
     However, far from radically changing its policy, Italy was only 
seeking to maintain its good relationships with the Arabs as shown by 
the ensuing debate concerning the UN initiatives. The UN resolution 
sponsored by the Latin-American countries appeared to the Italian 
government as «the only one able of not just realistic developments  but 
also able to avoid a crisis in the UN prestige».6 Though agreeing with 
this view, Fanfani suggested not to simply reject the non-aligned 
                                                 
3 On Great Britain’s policy see: M. GAT, Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 
1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War, Publishers, Westport (CT), Praeger 2003. 
4 See D. CAVIGLIA - M. CRICCO, La diplomazia italiana e gli equilibri mediterranei. La 
politica mediorientale dell’Italia dalla guerra dei Sei Giorni al conflitto dello Yom 
Kippur (1967-1973), Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino Editore, 2006, pp. 20-25; L. 
RICCARDI, Il “problema Israele”. Diplomazia italiana e PCI di fronte allo Stato ebraico 
(1948-1973), Milano, Guerini e Associati, 2006, pp. 215-222. On Italy’s policy during the 
crisis see also: L.V. FERRARIS, ed., Manuale della politica estera italiana 1947-1993, 
Bari, Laterza, 1996, pp. 168-171; A. VARSORI, L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 
1943 al 1992, Bari, Laterza, 1998, pp. 164-165. 
5
 See L. TOSI, ed., Sulla scena del mondo. L’Italia all’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni 
Unite 1955-2009, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2010, p. 13. 
6
 V sessione straordinaria d’urgenza dell’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite-
Istruzioni di voto impartite alla delegazione italiana, ACS, CM, b. 56, sottofasc. 4 “ONU 
Conflitto arabo-israeliano. Va sessione straordinaria dell’Assemblea Generale delle 
Nazioni Unite. Posizione italiana”, fasc. 8 “Istruzioni impartite alla delegazione italiana 
alle Nazioni Unite”. 
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countries resolution because «all the pro-Arab Western Mediterranean 
countries (France, Spain, Greece, Turkey) would endorse the non-
aligned motion thus allowing the Arabs to enhance critics and 
initiatives against us».7 
     Once again the Prime Minister Aldo Moro, urged by its diplomatic 
adviser,8 skillfully tackled the issue and imposed the decision already 
taken by the Cabinet to vote against the non-aligned resolution. In the 
days that followed Moro confirmed the Italian policy which «rather 
than sentencing», preferred «to investigate the deep rooted causes of the 
conflict and face them with a creative and constructive spirit».9 At the 
General Assembly of June 21, Moro included within the «unresolved 
problems» the right of every State to have «political independence, 
territorial integrity and the protection from threats and the use of force», 
as well as the «guaranteed freedom» of navigation. Two obvious 
concessions to Tel Aviv’s position, only partially balanced by the hints 
to the refugees whose presence – according to Moro – «was one of the 
                                                 
7
 Telegramma di Fanfani per Moro, Roma, 30 giugno 1967, ACS, CM, b. 56, sottofasc. 3 
“ONU Conflitto arabo-israeliano. V sessione straordinaria dell’Assemblea Generale delle 
Nazioni Unite. Corrispondenza”.  
8 See Appunto del Consigliere diplomatico del Pres. del Consiglio, Roma, 4 luglio 1967, 
ACS, CM, b. 56, sottofasc. 3 “ONU Conflitto arabo-israeliano. V sessione straordinaria 
dell’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite. Corrispondenza”.  
9
 Dichiarazioni all’Ansa dell’On. Moro alla vigilia della partenza per New York, Roma, 
19 giugno 1967, ACS, CM, b. 56, sottofasc. 4 “ONU Conflitto arabo-israeliano. V 
sessione straordinaria dell’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite. Posizione italiana”, 
fasc. 3 “a. Consiglio dei Ministri 19 maggio 1967, b. Consiglio dei Ministri 17 giugno 
1967, c. Dichiarazioni On. Moro in partenza per New York”. On Moro’s attitude toward 
the Arab-Israeli conflict see: F. IMPERATO, Aldo Moro e la pace nella sicurezza. La 
politica estera del centro-sinistra 1963-68, Bari, Progedit, 2011; L. RICCARDI, Aldo Moro 
e il Medio Oriente (1963-1978), in D. CAVIGLIA - D. DE LUCA - F. PERFETTI - A. 
UNGARI, eds., Aldo Moro nell’Italia contemporanea, Firenze, Le Lettere, 2011, pp. 551-
583. 
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reasons of the instability and tensions in the region». According to Luca 
Riccardi, the definition of the refugees as a «human, social and political 
problem permanently inserted the Palestinian issue into the Italian 
political agenda»; however Moro never made any reference to the term 
“people” used by Fanfani in his speech addressed to the Senate on June 
7. In his speech to Parliament on July 13 the Prime Minister referred to 
«the natural sympathy for the courageous Israeli people» and replied to 
the communist leader Longo that the failure of the Soviet sponsored 
resolution revealed that «the majority of the members of the United 
Nations did not accept the unilateral and simplistic explanation, 
according to which the Middle Eastern crisis derived exclusively from 
an Israeli aggressive act».10 The Italian Jewish Community largely 
welcomed these official declarations as proven in the letters sent to 
Moro by the President of the Roman Jewish Community and by the 
President of the Italian Jewish Community.11 
     On the whole, Italy’s policy during the Six Day War was still 
influenced by some elements favoring the Jewish State.12 First of all – 
as Moro explained to the Soviet Ambassador Nikita Rykov – in the 
                                                 
10
 Discorso del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri On. Prof. Aldo Moro, Roma, 13 
luglio 1967, ACS, CM, b. 56, fasc. “Segreteria particolare del Presidente del Consiglio 
dei Ministri. Medio Oriente. Dibattito in Parlamento 13 luglio 1967”. 
11
Telegramma di Tedeschi (Presidente Comunità Ebraica di Roma) per Moro, ACS, CM, 
b. 56, sottofasc. 5 “ONU Conflitto arabo-israeliano. Il Presidente Moro alla V sessione 
straordinaria dell’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite”. 
12
 Relations between Italy and Israel are investigated in: J. ABADI, Constraints and 
Adjustments in Italy’s Policy toward Israel, in «Middle Eastern Studies», XXXVIII, 4, 
October 2002, pp. 63-94; I. TREMOLADA, All’ombra degli arabi. Storia delle relazioni tra 
Italia e Israele, Milano, M&B Publishing, 2003. An overview concerning Italy’s foreign 
policy in the Mediterranean area is in: A. BROGI, L'Italia e l'egemonia americana nel 
Mediterraneo, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1996; M. De LEONARDIS, ed., Il Mediterraneo 
nella politica estera italiana del secondo dopoguerra, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003. 
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Italian public opinion, «not in the more conservative, but in the more 
democratic and progressive, there was the deeply rooted idea that 
Israel’s existence should be guaranteed». Whether it was a still living 
guilt for the Holocaust, whether it stemmed from some attracting 
aspects of Israeli society, a pro-Israel sentiment still prevailed and the 
government – as the Prime Minister recalled – «had to take it into 
account».13 Moreover, the small parties supporting the government 
maintained their traditional pro-Israel approach and, finally, the Jewish 
State was perceived as a Western stronghold threatened by authoritarian 
regimes backed by Moscow. However in the following months this 
attitude gradually declined when the protest movements began to 
criticize the Western model endorsing a pro-Third World attitude. The 
increasing opposition to American intervention in Vietnam identified 
more and more Israel with Washington’s imperialism thus fuelling the 
harsh criticism coming from the powerful Italian Communist Party.  
     In this changing scenario a growing coldness between Rome and Tel 
Aviv gradually took place. More than any other issue, at the core of the 
dispute lied a different perception regarding security issues. In Italy’s 
viewpoint security implied a global or, at least, a European dimension 
which consequently required a peaceful solution of the conflict even to 
face Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean. As Moro significantly 
remarked during a meeting with Nasser in May 1970, «the Soviet 
presence [in the Mediterranean] altered the balance of power and the 
situation upon which wider issues such as global security and peace, 
                                                 
13
 Colloquio con l’ambasciatore dell’Urss Nikita Rykov, Roma, 28 luglio 1967, ACS, 
CM, b. 157. 
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mainly European security, were based on».14 Although aware that at the 
eve of the détente era neither Washington nor Moscow «could 
overcome a certain threshold in defending their clients», Moro feared 
that «the two superpowers could be dragged by the belligerants to 
overcome the limits that they had automatically imposed on 
themselves».15 Against this perspective all the Italian initiatives aimed 
at downplaying the effects of the so called “war of attrition” involving 
Israel and Egypt. The Italian diplomacy reluctantly admitted that a 
political solution was «in the hands of the Four Powers» composing the 
Security Council, while «the true negotiations were conducted by 
Moscow and Washington». In this situation Italy could only promote 
«the diminution of tensions in the region»16 turning down the Arab 
demands for «a more active Italian role».17 This attitude inspired the 
Italian attempt to seek an agreement in order to freeze armaments 
supply, the initiative to restore a cease-fire based on the UN resolution 
adopted in ’67, the proposal for a gradual de-escalation lead by the Big 
                                                 
14
 Telegramma di Moro per il Presidente della Repubblica e il Presidente del Consiglio, 
Il Cairo, 24 maggio 1970, CM, b. 128, fasc. “Mae. Visita nelle Repubblica Araba Unita 
del ministro degli Esteri On. Moro (21-24 maggio 1970)”, sottofasc. “Visita nella RAU. 
Telegrammi e rapporti”. 
15
 Telegramma di Moro a varie Ambasciate, Roma, 27 marzo 1970, CM, b. 151, fasc. 2.5 
“Telegrammi. Iniziative italiane per la composizione del conflitto arabo-israeliano. 
Questione Medio Oriente”, sottofasc. “Archivio On. Ministro. Medio Oriente. Proposta 
italiana per un embargo sugli armamenti”. 
16
Appunto del Mae, s.d., CM, Mae, b. 151, fasc. 2.5 “Telegrammi. Iniziative italiane per 
la composizione del conflitto arabo-israeliano. Questione Medio Oriente”, sottofasc. 
“Archivio On. Ministro. Medio Oriente. Giugno 1970”.  
17
Telegramma di Moro per Presidente della Repubblica e Presidente del Consiglio, 
Istanbul, 1 maggio 1970, CM, b. 128, fasc. “Mae Segreteria Generale. Riunione dei capi 
missione nei paesi del Medio Oriente (Istanbul, 30 aprile-1 maggio 1970)”. 
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Four and, finally, the plan to guarantee the territorial integrity of 
Lebanon.  
     Although the Italian government realized that the two main actors 
were very far from an agreement, nonetheless the Prime Minister urged 
all negotiators «to seize the opportunity to seek […] a balanced 
approach promoting a first attempt of de-escalation [of the conflict]». 
Furthermore, Moro suggested to make the Jarring mission capable of 
«playing a more active role by submitting concrete proposals». All 
these initiatives stemmed from Italy’s growing awareness that time was 
working «to the advantage of the Soviet Union»18 which was extending 
its control over a large portion of the Mediterranean countries including 
the Palestinian movements.19 
     On this specific subject, the Italian Prime Minister pressed Joseph 
Sisco, the US State Department adviser for the Middle East, to take into 
further account «the increasing importance of the Palestinian issue». 
According to the Italian diplomats, the growing number of liberation 
movements was transforming the refugee issue from an economic 
problem into a political one. This changing scenario should force Israel 
«not to lose touch with Nasser» and should prompt the Americans «not 
to give the leaders of these movements the feeling that they were 
listened to only in Moscow and in Beijing».  Inside the Italian public 
opinion, Moro remarked «an emerging criticism» toward the Jewish 
                                                 
18
 Telegramma di Moro per Washington e New York, Roma, 19 giugno 1970, CM, b. 129, 
fasc. “Mae. Visita in Italia del ministro degli Affari Esteri di Israele Abba Eban (15-17 
giugno 1970)”, sottofasc. “Visita del ministro Abba Eban. Telegrammi”. 
19
 See Telegramma di Gaja per diverse Ambasciate, Roma, 19 giugno 1970, CM, b. 129, 
fasc. “Mae. Visita in Italia del ministro degli Affari Esteri di Israele Abba Eban (15-17 
giugno 1970)”, sottofasc. “Visita del ministro Abba Eban. Telegrammi”).  
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state which, on its part, «should better not entrench behind a formal 
position».20  
     In the meantime, the Italian government pressed Washington to 
reject Tel Aviv’s request for Phantom airplanes. According to the 
Italian diplomacy the supply of new weapons «would produce a 
dangerous effect» in the region and «would be in contrast with the aim 
of the mission recently operated [in the Middle East] by the Assistant 
Secretary of State [Joseph Sisco]».21 At the eve of Nasser’s visit to 
                                                 
20
 Telegramma di Gaja a varie ambasciate, Roma, 24 aprile 1970, CM, b. 128, fasc. 
“Mae. Riunione ambasciatori Medio Oriente. Telegrammi e Varie”. 
21
 Telegramma di Moro per Mae da inoltrare all’Ambasciata a Washington, Istanbul, 1 
maggio 1970, CM, b. 128, fasc. “Mae Segreteria Generale. Riunione dei capi missione 
nei paesi del Medio Oriente (Istanbul, 30 aprile-1 maggio 1970)”. On the US role during 
these years see: H.W. BRANDS, The Wages of Globalism. Lyndon Johnson and the Limits 
of American Power, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, cap. VII; S. DE 
LA FOYE, L’administration Nixon et le conflit israélo-arabe, in «Relation 
Internationales», n. 94, 1998, pp. 219-232 ; A. DONNO - G. IURLANO, eds., Nixon, 
Kissinger e il Medio Oriente (1969-1973), Firenze, Le Lettere, 2010; P.L. HAHN, The 
View from Jerusalem: Revelations about U.S. Diplomacy from the Archives of Israel, in 
«Diplomatic History», XXII, 4, Fall 1998, pp. 509-532; M.C. HUDSON, To Play the 
Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East, in «The Middle East 
Journal», L, 3, Summer 1996, pp. 329-343; N. KOCHAVI, Nixon and Israel: Forging a 
Conservative Partnership, Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 2009; 
D.W. LESCH, ed., The Middle East and the United States, Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 
1996; D. LITTLE, The Making of Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 
1957-68, in «International Journal of Middle East Studies», XXV, 4, November 1993, pp. 
563-585; W.B. QUANDT, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict since 1967, Berkely, CA, University of California Press, 2001, part I; S.L. 
SPIEGEL, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from 
Truman to Reagan, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1985; S. 
YAQUB, The Politics of Stalemate: The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, 1969-73, in N. ASHTON, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional 
Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, London and New York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 35-
58; G. VALDEVIT, Gli Stati Uniti e il Mediterraneo. Da Truman a Reagan, Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 1991. 
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Moscow, Moro warned again the Johnson administration to delete a 
decision which «would be psychologically inappropriate».22  
     Against this gloomy background, Italy abandoned the idea of a 
selective armaments control – considered «a little bit unrealistic»23 – 
and realized that «every effort to moderate the two parts was doomed to 
failure».24 In autumn 1970 the Italian diplomacy had already come to 
the conclusion that «both contenders aimed at winning by force» and 
this skepticism forced Rome to disclaim Abba Eban’s offer «to replace 
France».25 Certainly Italy did not want to hamper a common European 
foreign policy for the sake of a leading role in the Mediterranean 
region, but this decision was mainly due to the consciousness that the 
Jewish state froze in a «rigid and unchangeable position».26  
     This idea began to surface within the Italian diplomacy as a result of 
the visit paid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Israel at the 
                                                 
22
 Telegramma di Moro per Washington e New York, Roma, 19 giugno 1970, CM, b. 129, 
fasc. “Mae. Visita in Italia del ministro degli Affari Esteri di Israele Abba Eban (15-17 
giugno 1970)”, sottofasc. “Visita del ministro Abba Eban. Telegrammi”. The evolution of 
the special relationship between the US and Israel is investigated in: A. BEN-ZVI, The 
United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1993; A. BEN-ZVI, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to 
Israel: In the Shadow of the Hawk, London-Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 2004; D. DE 
LUCA, Alle radici dell’alleanza israelo-americana 1956-1963, Manduria, Lacaita, 2001; 
S. LASENSKY, Dollarizing Peace: Nixon, Kissinger and the Creation of the U.S.-Israeli 
Alliance, in «Israel Affairs», XIII,1, January 2007, pp. 164-186; E. STEPHENS, US Policy 
towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the ‘Special Relationship’, 
Brighton-Portland, OR, Sussex Academic Press, 2006. 
23
 Verbale riunione di capi missione dei paesi arabi e nel Mediterraneo, Tunisi, 6 
settembre 1970, CM, b. 130, fasc. “Mae.”. 
24
 Telegramma  di Moro per Presidente della Repubblica e Presidente del Consiglio, 
New York, 23 novembre 1970, CM, b. 150, fasc. 22 “Telegrammi in arrivo riservati, 
riservatissimi, segreti e segretissimi”. 
25
 Lettera per Gaja, Tel Aviv, 29 giugno 1971, CM, b. 153, fasc. 3.4 “Telegrammi in 
partenza riservati, riservatissimi, segreti, segretissimi”. 
26
 Nota autografa di Moro, Roma, 31 marzo 1971, CM, b. 153, fasc. 3.4 “Telegrammi in 
partenza riservati, riservatissimi, segreti, segretissimi”. 
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beginning of March.27 Before the meeting took place, the Italian 
ambassador, Walter Maccotta, urged Moro to stress the importance of a 
well trained army, of Us diplomatic and military support and of a 
mechanism for international guarantees involving the Security 
Council28 in order to improve Israel’s security. Notwithstanding, during 
the conversations with the Italian delegation, Moshe Dayan and Golda 
Meir clarified that all the security issues were separated from a regional 
framework and, mostly, from the cold war dynamics. And when Moro 
proposed a new initiative aimed at reactivating the Channel of Suez, 
Dayan expressed its «skepticism» as far as «there was still the risk of a 
resumed conflict». According to the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs 
the creation of the Jewish state could be compared to «a transplant of an 
organ into another body (that is the Arab world) which tended to reject 
it». For this reason, Israel «needed safe and defendable borders as long 
as the presence of this new state would be accepted».29 In the following 
meeting, Golda Meir confirmed this position stating that, after the 
disappointing experiences of ’67, any international guarantee could be 
taken into account «only if in addition to safe borders».30 Golda Meir’s 
                                                 
27
 An assessment of the talks is in RICCARDI, Il “problema Israele”, cit., pp. 380-386. 
28
 Lettera di Maccotta per Moro, Tel Aviv, 24 febbraio 1971, CM, b. 133, fasc. “Mae. 
Visita in Israele del ministro degli Affari Esteri Aldo Moro (4-8 marzo 1971)”, sottofasc. 
“Mae. Visita in Israele del ministro degli Affari Esteri Aldo Moro. Argomenti di 
conversazione”. 
29
 Telegramma di Moro per Presidente della Repubblica e Presidente del Consiglio, Tel 
Aviv, 8 marzo 1971, CM, b. 133, fasc. “Mae. Visita in Israele del ministro degli Affari 
Esteri Aldo Moro (4-8 marzo 1971)”, sottofasc. “Visita in Israele On. Ministro. 
Telegrammi e documentazione”. 
30
 Telegramma di Moro per Presidente della Repubblica e Presidente del Consiglio, Tel 
Aviv, 8 marzo 1971, CM, b. 133, fasc. “Mae. Visita in Israele del ministro degli Affari 
Esteri Aldo Moro (4-8 marzo 1971)”, sottofasc. “Visita in Israele On. Ministro. 
Telegrammi e documentazione”. 
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reply confirmed to the Italian Foreign Minister that «the acceptance of a 
likely resumption of the hostilities appeared to be a demonstration of 
strength nourished by the Israeli leaders».31  
     As pointed out by the General Secretary of the Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Ludovico Gaja, the Israelis «were basically convinced 
that their country was strong enough to afford the disapproval of the 
majority of the worldwide public opinion and, with some limits, of the 
American government too». Moreover, the Italian diplomat envisaged a 
connection between the Israeli and the Soviet position on the grounds 
of a common interest to promote a situation similar to «neither peace 
nor war»32 based on partial solutions. This approach obviously ruled out 
both the fulfillment of the Rogers plan and the option of a complete 
withdrawal from the occupied territories, while the declaration of the 
EEC ministers favoring the application of the 242 resolution increased 
tensions. Against these growing differences between Rome and Tel 
Aviv, within the Italian diplomacy began to surface an increasing 
criticism toward the Jewish state. At times these reproaches coincided 
with astonishing prejudices as it turned out from this note prepared for 
Moro by the Italian ambassador in Israel Walter Maccotta: «[The Jews] 
are, in fact, one people, one entity, one ethnic and one religious group, 
completely separated. According to the Jews the world is divided into 
two parts: the chosen people and the Goims. Someone, turning upside 
down this reasoning has said that the two parts are the anti-semitics and 
the jews: and this too is partially true. A kind of feeling deeply rooted 
                                                 
31
 Telegramma di Moro per Presidente della Repubblica e Presidente del Consiglio, cit. 
32
 Telegramma di Gaja per varie Ambasciate, Roma, 14 marzo 1971, CM, b. 153, fasc. 
3.4 “Telegrammi in partenza riservati, riservatissimi, segreti, segretissimi”. 
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in the jews of Israel and especially in the ruling class […]. They 
perceived themselves not only encircled by an Arab ocean […], but as 
objects, or naturally designated victims, either of hostility or of 
generalized misunderstandings that they returned with the same coin. 
The “ghetto complex” – although, today, triumphalistic – is a peculiar 
element of Israel. This sentiment explains both its unshakeable need of 
recognition and security, and its tenacity and strong will to resist even 
against all […]. In the Middle East conflict two opposing extremisms 
are clashing, and all territorial, procedural, even economic issues often 
tend to disappear compared to a deep and irreparable meta-politic 
difference, involving religious and ideological characters».33 
     Undoubtedly Maccotta’s opinions were far from the one expressed 
ten years before by the counsel in Haifa, Furio Zampetti, who labeled 
Judaism as «nothing other than a movement based on racism of a clear 
nature ».34 
     Nonetheless, in that period the offices of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs showed a more aggressive attitude and defined Zionism as a 
«reaction» against «an impossible yet seeked assimilation». After this 
superficial statement, the note prepared in June ’70 examined the 
“double loyalty” issue maintaining that if the country of residence and 
citizenship of the Jews should adopt a unfavorable policy towards Israel 
a “dramatic” situation could arise. This would occur since the Jews 
«exploited, skillfully and daringly, the accusation of anti-semitism to 
                                                 
33
Appunto di Maccotta in vista della visita di Moro sulle peculiarità di Israele, Tel Aviv, 
s.d., CM, b. 133, fasc. “Mae. Visita in Israele del ministro degli Affari Esteri Aldo Moro 
(4-8 marzo 1971)”, sottofasc. “Visita in Israele On. Ministro. Telegrammi e 
documentazione”. 
34
 On the same subject see RICCARDI, Il “problema Israele, cit., pp. 133- 136. 
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hinder all anti-Israel governments»; and for this purpose they could rely 
on a strong influence «which could not be compared to their number: 
just like the feudal lords in the medieval age». The document concluded  
that «the Jews from all over the world acted behind Israel, with the 
strength due to a maximum presence in many centers of power  and  
religiously convinced of their presence in the world due to a divine 
promise, while other states, people, regimes disappeared as history had 
proven».35  
     The harsh tones of the analysis signaled a growing divide, even 
psychological, between the two countries. On one hand, the Italian 
ambassador remarked that «within the Israeli policy makers and public 
opinion a certain nervousness and an anti-goim sentiment nourished 
with far-off historic memories apart from recent political events» was 
increasing. On the other, the international public opinion – as Maccotta 
explained – was more and more critical about the Jewish state since its 
position regarding the territories seemed anachronistic in a time which 
constantly «rejected the burden of conquest».36 
     This new trend following the Six Day War obviously paved the way 
to the pro-Arab policy that emerged during the October ’73 War.37 It is 
well known that the risk of an oil embargo carried out by the OPEC 
countries prompted all the EEC’s members, except Netherland, to adopt 
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«an autonomous position […] in regards to the United States»38 in the 
joint declarations of October 13th and November 6th. The Italian 
ministry of foreign affairs pointed out that «unlike in ’67 Europe did 
not stand unconditionally on Israel’s side» and sometimes «indifference 
and even hostility from a large part of the European public opinion, 
including Italy» emerged.39 As far as it was concerned, the Italian 
government assumed that the oil crisis strengthened the two 
superpowers and weakened the Arabs and the European countries. 
Therefore Italy carried on its new Mediterranean approach within the 
framework of a European policy trying to keep good relations with the 
Arab countries in sight of a renewed cooperation. 
     After the conflict, the Italian diplomacy often claimed its pro-Arab 
initiatives: the bilateral assistance conceded to many Arab states, the 
attempts to promote in the US «a greater sensitivity regarding the 
Mediterranean situation» and, finally, the European positions adopted 
within the Security Council «in favor of the Arab cause and in contrast 
with the US». Despite all the efforts, in the short term Italy did not 
avoid the embargo imposed by the OPEC countries in December ’73 
and the continuation of a divisive strategy which – according to Moro – 
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weakened the European chances «of influencing to a certain degree»40 
the two superpowers. 
     Nonetheless the Christian democratic leader relentlessly pursued a 
dialogue between Europe and the Arab countries based on «open minds 
and looking toward the future generations, involving industrial, 
agricultural, technological and political aspects». This aim obviously 
implied some more political concessions to the Arab’s viewpoint. In his 
speech addressed to the Commission of Foreign Affairs in January 
1974, Moro called for an integral application of the 242 
«wholeheartedly in all its parts», and he referred to the Palestinian issue 
as «a political problem which could not be ignored» because they 
«were not seeking for assistance but for a homeland». Therefore Israel 
should relinquish «all the occupied territories» and even the delicate 
issue of the Holocaust could not be invoked since the Jewish state 
should cease being «a besieged fortress» to become «an element 
composing a geo-political order». In replying to the accusations of 
opportunism, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed that Italy was 
acting «always along the same line», but when he stressed the efforts 
carried out «in order to guarantee the energetic supplies necessary to 
the industry and civil life»,41 the change of Italy’s diplomatic priorities 
appeared evident.  
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     During a visit of Sadat two years later, Moro confirmed Italy’s 
preference for the return «of all the territories occupied by Israel» and 
the right of the Palestinians «to create their homeland». The change of 
the Italian attitude was so well understood that during the talks the 
Egyptian President insisted on arms supply in order to replace the 
Soviet arsenal. Even though unwilling to sell arms to Cairo, Moro told 
Sadat that the government «would examine all possibilities»,42 thus 
showing how far Italy was from the embargo policy pursued in the 
previous years. 
     The different evolution of the concept of security, the change of the 
public opinions’ attitude and the energetic crisis were key elements 
explaining the increasing tension between Italy and Israel at the 
beginning of the 1970’s. From the second half of the decade another 
factor emerged: in view of what was later called the “compromesso 
storico” a pro-Arab policy became a common ground encouraging the 
participation of the Italian Communist Party to the government. In 
short, many elements concurred in shaping a different approach and the 
growing consciousness that national interests laid on better relations 
with the Arabs gradually pushed the Italian diplomacy to adopt a new 
Mediterranean policy which lasted for a long time. 
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